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In Regulating Opt-Out: An Economic Theory of Altering Rules, Ian 
Ayres presents a Big Idea: to understand contract law, we need to 
understand not only default rules, but also the rules that say when a default 
does not apply.1 The latter Ayres calls “altering rules.” Altering rules are the 
other side of the default coin. You cannot have a default without also 
having a rule for when it does not hold. Yet contract theorists have to date 
paid much more attention to how to set the default. They have not thought 
systematically about how to design rules for avoiding the default.2 Ayres’s 
Big Idea is that we stand in need a theory of these altering rules. The article 
aims to provide such a theory. 
This is an important project, and Regulating Opt-Out brings us at 
least part of the way toward a general theory of altering rules. Ayres’s 
economic approach, however, creates a blind spot that renders his theory 
incomplete. Ayres focuses almost entirely on one type of altering rule: rules 
designed to give the parties control over their legal obligations. In doing so, 
he all but ignores another, equally important type: rules designed to 
interpret the nonlegal meaning of the parties’ agreement. 
What is an altering rule? Ayres writes early on that an altering rule is 
a rule that provides “the necessary and sufficient conditions for displacing a 
default legal treatment with some particular other legal treatment.”3 Though 
Ayres puts the sentence in italics, this cannot be a complete definition. The 
default rule in Article 2 of the UCC, for example, is that a nonmerchant 
seller does not warrant that goods are merchantable, but a merchant seller 
does.4 Although being a merchant is sufficient to displace the nonmerchant 
default, I do not think that Ayres would want to say it is part of an altering 
rule. It is an example of what Ayres calls a “tailored default.” More like a 
definition is Ayres’s statement that “[a]n altering rule in essence says that if 
contractors say or do this, they will achieve a particular contractual result.”5 
                                                
* Professor of Law and Associate Dean of Research and Academic 
Programs, Georgetown University Law Center. 
1 121 Yale L.J. 2032 (2012). 
2 But see Gregory Klass, Intent to Contract, 95 Va. L. Rev. 1437, 1461-75 
(2009) (discussing the design of defaults and “opt-out rules”); id. at 1475-99 
(applying the discussion of defaults and opt-out rules to analyze the 
conditions of contractual validity for four types of agreements). 
3 Ayres, Altering Rules, supra note 1 at 2036. 
4 UCC 2-314. 
5 Ayres, Altering Rules, supra note 1 at 2036. 
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I take this to describe the identifying feature of altering rules. An altering 
rule looks not at who the parties are, the relationship between them, or the 
type of agreement they are entering into, but at what the parties do. An 
altering rule says when parties have acted in a way that displaces the 
default. 
How do Ayres’s categories of default and altering rules map onto 
the familiar distinction between rules of interpretation and rules of 
construction? In a helpful article on the distinction, Lawrence Solum writes 
that interpretation is “the process (or activity) that recognizes or discovers 
the linguistic meaning or semantic content of the legal text,” whereas 
construction is “the process that gives a text legal effect (either by 
translating the linguistic meaning into legal doctrine or by applying or 
implementing the text).”6 Solum’s emphasis on texts reflects his article’s 
focus on constitutional law. In contract law, the interpretive data include 
more than just texts. Contract interpretation attempts to describe the parties’ 
agreement, if there is one. That requires examining not only written texts, 
but also oral or other non-written communications, as well as industry 
practice, prior dealings between the parties and their post-formation 
behavior. But the difference lies not only in the relevant data. In most cases, 
contract interpretation seeks to recover not semantic content, a text’s 
linguistic meaning, but communicative content: what in the circumstances 
the parties objectively intended to say with their words and actions.7 And 
when a contract is wholly implied in fact, interpretation aims not even at 
that. A contract is implied in fact when the parties have not communicated 
their agreement in any form. In these cases, interpretation seeks out not 
communicative content, but the parties’ objective understanding of their 
obligations given their acts and the background norms that apply to their 
situation. In either case, the ultimate question is not semantic content, but 
whether the parties entered into an agreement and, if so, its content. Courts 
express this by saying that the goal of contract interpretation is to discover 
                                                
6 Lawrence Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 Const. 
Comm. 101, 101 (2010). See also Arthur Linton Corbin, 3 Corbin on 
Contracts: A Comprehensive Treatise on the Rules of Contract Law § 534 at 
7 (1951) (“By ‘interpretation of language’ we determine what ideas that 
language induces in other persons. By ‘construction of the contract,’ as the 
term will be used here, we determine its legal operation—its effect upon the 
action of courts and administrative officials.”). 
7 See Paul Grice, Meaning, 66 Phil. Rev. 377 (1957), reprinted in Paul 
Grice, Studies in the Way of Words 213 (1989); P.F. Strawson, Intention 
and Convention in Speech Acts, 73 Phil. Rev. 439 (1964). 
Interpretation and Construction in Altering Rules 3 
 3 
the parties’ intent.8 Contract construction is then the process of determining 
the legal effect of the agreement that the parties intended. 
Contract scholars often speak of default rules as rules of 
interpretation. We use terms like “default interpretations” or “interpretive 
defaults.” This is because we often do not attend to the interpretation-
construction distinction—which is fine, as long as everyone is clear that 
“interpretation” is being used to include construction.9 If we attend to the 
difference, it is clear that contract default are rules of construction.10 A 
default rule determines the legal effect of an act or omission. One reason 
we associate contract defaults with rules of interpretation is that defaults are 
often designed to get at what the parties probably intended, or would have 
intended had they thought about the question. Majoritarian defaults reflect 
lawmakers best guess at what most parties want out of their contracts. 
Efficient defaults attempt to anticipate the terms sophisticated self-interested 
parties should want. But these rules do not require any act of interpretation 
in the narrower sense. Predicting parties’ likely preferences or intentions is 
not the same as interpreting the parties’ intentions in a given case.11 
Moreover, as Ayres has been arguing since 1989, not all default rules are or 
should be majoritarian ones.12 Penalty defaults are designed not to get at 
the terms most parties want, but to give one or both parties a new reason to 
take some action—namely, to opt out of the default. They are designed 
                                                
8 Depending on the case, this might mean the parties’ objective intent or 
their subjective intent. See Lawrence Solan, Contract as Agreement, 83 
Notre Dame L. Rev. 353 (2007). 
9 When Ayres’ uses the word “interpretation,” he means only construction. 
Thus Ayres suggests thinking “of interpretation as a function, f(), that relates 
actions of contractual parties, a, and the surrounding circumstances or 
contexts, c, to particular legal effects, e: e=f(a,c).” Ayres, Altering Rules, 
supra note 1 at 2046. See also, Klass, Intent to Contract, supra note 2 (using 
“interpretation” to refer to construction). 
10 Corbin recognized something like this point in the first edition of his 
treatise: “When a court is filling gaps in the terms of an agreement, with 
respect to matters that the parties did not have in contemplation and as to 
which they had no intention to be expressed, the judicial process . . . . may 
be called ‘construction’; it should not be called ‘interpretation.’” Corbin, 
supra note 6, § 534 at 9. 
11 For a variation on this point, see Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Must I Mean 
What You Think I Should Have Said?, 98 Va. L. Rev. 159, 163 (2012); 
Gregory Klass, To Perform or Pay Damages, 98 Va. L. Rev. 143, 145-47 
(2012). 
12 Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An 
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 Yale L.J. 87 (1989). 
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precisely not to reflect the parties’ preferences, and not to map onto their 
likely intentions. 
Altering rules are also rules of construction. They determine the 
legal effect of what the parties say or do. Ayres focuses on one type of 
altering rule: rules that are designed to help parties get the legal outcomes 
they want, though as Ayres points out, such rules also might attempt to slow 
parties with extra transaction costs. For reasons explained below, and for 
lack of a more elegant term, I will call these “juristic” altering rules. There is 
however, a second type of altering rule: rules that turn on the nonlegal 
meaning of the parties’ words and actions. These rules are not designed to 
enable parties to get the legal outcomes they want, but to make legal 
outcomes depend on facts about the world that might have nothing to do 
with the parties’ legal intent. I will call these “hermeneutic” altering rules, 
another term ugly enough to be safe from kidnappers. Because hermeneutic 
altering rules are less familiar to readers of Regulating Opt-Out, I begin with 
them. 
Negotiations, offers, acceptances, agreements, releases, 
repudiations and the like are things that happen in the world, whether the 
law pays attention to them or not. Hermeneutic altering rules are rules of 
construction start from the best interpretation of the nonlegal meaning of 
such acts. Was, for example, the defendant’s statement an offer to enter into 
a contract, or was it better understood as a joke? What does “all loss, 
damage, expense and liability resulting from injury to property” mean to 
sophisticated parties when it appears in an indemnification clause? Did the 
plaintiff’s actions express an clear intent to breach? The rule then specifies 
the legal effect of one or another meaning. If the statement was an offer, it 
gave the plaintiff the power of acceptance. If the indemnification clause 
referred to party losses, the defendant must pay for damage to the plaintiff’s 
property. If the plaintiff’s actions expressed an intent not to perform, she 
repudiated the contract and was the first to breach. Section 202 of the 
Second Restatement is a nice example of a general hermeneutic altering 
rule: “Words and other conduct are interpreted in light of all the 
circumstances and if the principal purpose of the parties is ascertainable it 
is given great weight.”13 When determining the parties’ legal obligations, an 
adjudicator should give “great weight” to the reasonable, all-things-
considered meaning of the parties’ agreement. 
If we take hermeneutic altering rules as our model, it is natural to 
assume that interpretation comes first, construction second. As Corbin put 
the point, “[t]he interpretation of communications is necessary as a 
preliminary to the determination of their legal operation or total lack of 
                                                
13 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 202(1). 
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legal operation.”14 A court first must decide what a text means before it can 
decide the legal consequences of that meaning. 
Although this ordering is correct from the perspective of courts, it 
does not describe how other legal actors think about interpretation and 
construction. Because Ayres is an economist, he is mostly interested in the 
incentives that rules of construction create. Specifically, he is interested in 
the incentives they create for legally sophisticated parties entering into a 
contract. To these legal actors, rules of construction look more like 
instructions, telling them how to get the legal obligations they want and 
avoid those they would rather not have. From the perspective of 
sophisticated parties, rules of construction often come first. These parties 
use those rules to guide their actions. More to the point, the meaning of 
sophisticated parties’ actions can be understood only by reference to the 
rules the determine those actions legal effects (though those legal effects 
might not exhaust that meaning).15 Here the rules of construction come first. 
Juristic altering rules are designed on the assumption that parties 
will treat the rule as instructions for how to get the legal outcome they 
prefer. These rules typically require parties to perform what Germans call a 
“Rechtsgeschäft,” which can be translated as a “juristic act.” 
 
The juristic act . . . is a declaration of private will 
[Privatwillenserklärung] directed at the realization of a legal effect, 
an effect  that follows on the authority of the legal system because it 
is willed. The essence of the juristic act is found in the fact that a 
will directed at the realization of the legal effect is confirmed, and 
that the legal system issues a judgment, in recognition of that will, 
that gives legal effect to the desired legal arrangement.16 
 
In contract law, the most obvious juristic acts are what Ayres calls 
“passwords”, by which he means legal formalities.17 A legal formality is a 
                                                
14 Corbin, supra note 6, § 534 at 9. 
15 This way in which interpretation presupposes an understanding of the 
rules of construction differs form Corbin’s suggestion that judicial 
“interpretation will vary with the construction that must follow.” Corbin, 
supra note 6, § 534 at 10. Corbin is talking here about rules of construction, 
such as contra proferentem, that direct courts how to choose between 
different available interpretations. 
161 Motive zu dem Entwurfe Eines Bürgerlichengesetzbuches für das 
Deutsche Reich, 126 (Berlin & Leipzig, J. Guttentag 1888) (Ger.) (author’s 
translation). 
17 Ayres, Altering Rules, supra note 1 at 2080-83. These are what P.F. 
Strawson called “conventional” speech acts. Strawson, supra note 7 at 457; 
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speech act whose meaning lies first and usually foremost in its legal effect. 
By requiring an act that has no other meaning or effect—such as writing the 
words “locus sigilli” or “L.S.” on a document—lawmakers can be sure that 
parties are acting with the desired legal purpose. Alternatively, as Ayres 
points out, judicial interpretation can turn ordinary boilerplate into 
something like a formality. A court’s interpretation of a string of words can 
give it a legal meaning very different from its everyday semantic and 
presumptively communicative content. When used by sophisticated parties, 
the meaning of those words can be understood only by reference to the rule 
of construction that determines their legal effect.18 But not all juristic 
altering rules require that the parties perform a formal legal act. Williston’s 
Model Written Obligations Act, for example, provides that a signed promise 
“shall not be invalid or unenforceable for lack of consideration, if the 
writing also contains an additional express statement, in any form of 
                                                                                                                     
see also Kent Bach & Robert M. Harnish, Linguistic Communication and 
Speech Acts 120–34 (1979). 
18 Ayres, Altering Rules, supra note 1 at 2082. James Oldham provides a 
wonderful example. For centuries, the standardized language in a Lloyd’s 
marine insurance policy described the covered risks as follows: 
Touching the Adventures and Perils which we the Assurers are 
contented to bear and do take upon us in this Voyage, they are, of 
the Seas, Men-of-War, Fire, Enemies, Pirates, Rovers, Thieves, 
Jettisons, Letters of Mart and Counter- mart, Surprisals, Takings at 
Sea, Arrests, Restraints and Detainments of all Kings, Princes, and 
People, of what Nation, Condition or Quality soever, Barratry of the 
Master and Mariners, and of all other Perils, Losses and Misfortunes 
that have or shall come to the Hurt, Detriment, or Damage of the 
said Goods and Merchandises and Ship, &c., or any Part thereof. 
In his 1914 treatise, Sir Douglas Owen observed, “If such a contract were to 
be drawn up for the first time to-day, it would be put down as the work of a 
lunatic endowed with a private sense of humour.” 
It is an ancient and incoherent document, occasionally the subject 
of judicial remarks in the highest degree uncomplimentary. But 
nobody minds this or dreams of altering the ancient form, nor, one 
may imagine, is it ever likely to be altered. Insurance experts 
know—or very often know—exactly what it means, and with 
generations of legal interpretations hanging almost to every word, 
and almost certainly to every sentence, in it, it would be highly 
dangerous to tamper with it. 
Sir Douglas Owen, Ocean Trade and Shipping 158, 155 (1914). See also 
James C. Oldham, Insurance Litigation Involving the Zong and other British 
Slave Ships, 1780-1807, 28 J. Legal Hist. 299 (2007). 
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language, that the signer intends to be legally bound.”19 The proposed rule 
requires only an express statement of an intent to depart from the no-
enforcement default. It does not specify in what words that intent must be 
expressed. Nonformal juristic altering rules, like hermeneutic rules, require 
interpretation. If a court were ever asked to apply the Model Written 
Obligations Act, it would have to first ask whether the writing contained an 
express statement of an intent to be legally bound. But the question is a 
very narrow one: Does the writing express the requisite legal intent, not 
what is its overall meaning. 
Before turning to the implications for Ayres’s project, two more 
general observations about the difference between hermeneutic and juristic 
altering rules. First, each type is loosely associated with a distinct function 
of contract law.20 Juristic altering rules, which look for an expression of the 
parties’ legal intent, give parties greater control over their legal obligations 
to one another, expanding party autonomy. Juristic rules make it easier for 
parties to use contract law to engage in form of private legislation. They 
serve the purpose of conferring on private persons a limited lawmaking 
power. Hermeneutic altering rules, on the contrary, are often designed to 
get at the nonlegal meaning of the parties’ communications and other acts, 
meanings that cannot be defined in advance. Such rules give the parties 
somewhat less control over the legal consequences of what they do, for 
they do not provide the safe harbors of legal formalities. Hermeneutic rules 
are more suited to taking account of the parties’ nonlegal duties, such as the 
moral obligation to perform. Or to make the same point from the other 
direction, if we want contract law to take account of parties’ actual moral 
obligations, adjudicators must sometimes be called on to interpret the 
nonlegal meaning of what they say and do. Hermeneutic rules further the 
purpose of using contract law to impose duties on parties, not because they 
want those duties but for other reasons. 
That said, the connection between almost any legal rule and its 
function is a loose one. I have been speaking as if an altering rule is either 
hermeneutic or juristic. The second point is that many rules of contract law 
are a mix of the two. A simple example is a written gratuitous promise 
under seal in a jurisdiction that still recognizes that formality. Enforcement 
here turns on the formal act of affixing a seal. The rule is juristic. But the 
legal content of the obligation depends on what the document says. That 
requires interpretation, and so the rule is hermeneutic. I argue below that 
the rule in Jacob & Youngs v. Kent is a more subtle sort of mixed rule. For 
                                                
19 Model Written Obligations Act § 1, in Handbook of the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and Proceedings of 
the Thirty-Fifth Annual Meeting 584 (1925). 
20 See Gregory Klass, Three Pictures of Contract: Duty, Power and 
Compound Rule, 83 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1726 (2008). 
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the moment, I simply want to emphasize that a single altering rule might 
include both hermeneutic and juristic elements. By the same token, it 
would be a mistake to assume that hermeneutic altering rules are always 
associated with contract law’s duty-imposing function, or that juristic 
altering rules are associated with its power-conferring aspect. 
So what does all this tell us about Ayres’s analysis? Ayres is much 
more interested in juristic altering rules than he is in hermeneutic ones. This 
explains the repeated mining of Microsoft UX guidelines for design tips. 
Ayres cares about rules that, like software menus or dialog boxes, operate 
as instructions to parties, rules that tell them how to get the terms they 
want. The focus on juristic altering rules also explains Ayres’s attempts to 
distinguish the rules he cares about from “the larger law of interpretation,” 
which I read to mean altering rules more generally.21 The rules he will 
discuss, Ayres writes, provide “a small set of sought-after alternatives to the 
default” and are “more often concerned with the necessary and sufficient 
elements for displacement.”22 Both hermeneutic and juristic altering rules 
specify the legal effect e of an act a. Broadly speaking, therefore, both 
describe necessary, sufficient, or necessary and sufficient conditions for 
legal change. But a hermeneutic rule typically says that the scope of e 
reflects the meaning of a. That meaning, in turn, is not given by a legal rule, 
but depends on an open-ended interpretive inquiry.23 As Corbin puts the 
                                                
21 Ayres, Altering Rules, supra note 1 at 2045-46. As I observed above, 
Ayres uses “interpretation” to mean what I am calling “construction.” See 
supra note 9. 
22 Ayres, Altering Rules, supra note 1 at 2047. I do not think that Ayres 
should commit himself to another claim in the same paragraphs: that 
altering rules often apply where “the default potentially being displaced is 
not blank,” that is, where there is not already a contractual duty. It is true 
that, in contemporary contract law, telling whether the parties have moved 
from a no-duty state to a duty state typically requires an all-things-
considered interpretive inquiry. But that is only because the contemporary 
conditions of contractual validity are hermeneutic rules. They require actual 
agreement, objective or subjective, as distinguished from the performance 
of this or that juristic act. Other legal systems at other times have employed 
juristic conditions of contractual validity, such as the Roman stipulatio or 
the common law seal. Such rules provide precise instructions how to move 
from a no-duty to a duty state. And if we broaden our definition of “contract 
law” a bit to include things like corporate law, which governs the 
agreement-based obligations among owners and managers, we find many 
juristic altering rules for moving from no-duty to duty states. 
23 For a brief description of those rules, see Gregory Klass, Meaning, 
Purpose and Cause in the Law of Deception, 100 Geo. L.J. 449, 457-60 
(2012) 
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latter point, “[t]here is no single rule of interpretation of language, and there 
are no rules of interpretation taken all together, that will infallibly lead to 
the one correct understanding and meaning.”24 Interpretive rules cannot, 
therefore, be reduced to a simple list of necessary and sufficient conditions, 
and interpretation can produce an unlimited number of meanings. And 
because they incorporate interpretation, hermeneutic altering rules neither 
specify menus of legal outcomes nor identify necessary or even sufficient 
simple acts that will produce them. Juristic rules, on the contrary, typically 
identify the legal effect e in advance, and then require a formal act a or 
some other expression of an intent to achieve that effect. Juristic rules are 
therefore more likely to provide a menu of legal effects and to describe a set 
of necessary and/or sufficient acts to achieve them. In short, the features 
that Ayres identifies as characteristic of the altering rules he cares about are 
characteristic of juristic altering rules. 
Ayres’s nearly exclusive interest in juristic altering rules is fine as far 
as it goes. One of the most important contributions of the economic 
analysis of contract law has been to give us a better understanding of how 
legal rules can influence party decisionmaking. Economic analysis of 
private law has largely focused on how backward-looking decisions about 
litigants’ rights and obligations affect the forward-looking incentives of 
future parties. That feedback effect appears throughout the law. Deterrence 
presupposes it. But its operation in the law of contract is a bit more 
complex than elsewhere. Contract law not only gives parties a new reason 
to perform their agreements, but also gives them the ability to undertake 
new legal obligations to one another. Unlike other areas of the law, the 
rules of contract law feedback to influence not only the decision whether or 
not to commit a legal wrong, but also the decision whether and how to 
incur the legal duty. The rules influence parties not only at the time of 
performance, but also at the time of formation. Ayres’s focus on juristic 
altering rules, like his earlier discussions of penalty defaults, helps us to 
think systematically about those important effects.25 
                                                
24 Corbin, supra note 6, § 535 at 13. 
25 One of the crucial, and often overlooked claims, of the theory of efficient 
breach is that remedial rules affect not only the performance-breach 
decision, but also the parties’ decision at the time of performance. The idea 
can be found as early as 1972, in John H. Barton’s The Economic Basis of 
Damages for Breach of Contract, which emphasizes the remedy’s impact on 
quantity term. 1 J. Legal Stud. 277 (1972). More recently, Richard Craswell 
has emphasized its effect on price. Richard Craswell, Promises and Prices, 
45 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 735 (2012); see also Daniel Markovits and Alan 
Schwartz, The Myth of Efficient Breach: New Defenses of the Expectation 
Interest, 97 Va. L. Rev. 1939 (2011). 
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 That said, I believe that Ayres’s near exclusive focus on juristic 
altering rules distorts his analysis. Ayres’s theory fails to recognize why we 
sometime prefer hermeneutic altering rules. The omission is glaring in Table 
3, which classifies legal rules according to whether they specify, first, a 
menu of alternatives to the default and, second, a (juristic) altering rule.26 
Ayres suggests that rules that do not “give guidance about either the non-
default options or the mechanisms for achieving them” are characteristic of 
“’immature’ regimes where the accretion of precedent has not provided 
judicial disclosure guidance about particular mechanisms that are sufficient 
to achieve particular alternatives.”27 But as I argued above, this also 
describes hermeneutic altering rules. Because interpretation requires an all-
things-considered inquiry into the nonlegal meaning of the parties’ acts, 
hermeneutic altering rules cannot be formulated in terms of simple 
sufficiency conditions. And because hermeneutic rules provide legal effect 
should reflect that meaning, they do not provide menus of possible legal 
outcomes. If it is among the functions of a mature contract regime to track 
or otherwise take account of the parties’ moral or other nonlegal 
obligations, contract law will include rules of this type. Their existence is 
not a sign of immaturity, but of the various functions that contract law 
serves. 
The category of hermeneutic rules also cast new light on why 
juristic altering rules so often specify sufficient but not necessary conditions 
for non-default terms. Ayres identifies three possible goals in the design of 
altering rules: minimizing transaction costs, reducing error, and impeding 
departures from the default. Error-reduction and impedance both require 
necessary altering rules—rules that limit how parties can avoid the default. 
Error-reduction is achieved by rules that require clear language, enhanced 
manifestations of assent or procedures that train parties.28 Impedance rules 
establish speed bumps and roadblocks, mechanisms that work only if there 
are no alternate routes to non-default terms. Ayres suggests that non-
necessary altering rules can work to minimize transaction costs, the third 
possible design goal. But his argument unconvincing. Ayres writes: 
 
Giving effect to a multiplicity of methods [to avoid the default] 
reduces the costs of learning the law—especially the necessity to 
learn the altering rules themselves. A contract law that includes 
necessary elements for displacement will tend to increase the cost 
                                                
26 Ayres, Altering Rules, supra note 1 at 2052. 
27 Id. at 2053. 
28 Id. at 2072-83. 
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of becoming (and remaining) informed of the requisite procedures 
for displacement.29 
 
Although a multiplicity of methods might lower the costs to the drafting 
party, it can significantly increase the costs of understanding the agreement 
for the nondrafting party. To be certain of the legal significance of the 
agreement, a nondrafting party must be certain of the legal effects of all of 
its pieces. The more ways there are of saying the same thing, the more the 
nondrafting party will need to know if she is to understand what it is she is 
signing. And Ayres appears to be advocating open lists of displacement 
procedures, to which new methods of opting-out can be added. Far from 
reducing the costs of remaining informed, allowing additions to the list 
increases those costs. This is especially so if the additions are not pure legal 
formalities—acts that have no nonlegal meaning, or what Ayres calls 
“passwords”—but emerge from judicial interpretation of party-drafted 
contract language. When boilerplate comes to have a formal legal meaning, 
it may not be obvious to the nondrafting party that the words are now 
magic ones. The nondrafting party might not realize that those words now 
constitute a juristic act, rather than expressing their original, nonlegal 
meaning. If we want to minimize transaction costs, sufficient and necessary 
altering rules are the way to go. At the very least we should expect 
necessary rules in the form of the Model Written Obligations Act that 
require “an additional express statement, in any form of language,” of the 
signer’s legal intent.30 
So what explains the fact that many altering rules in our law of 
contract stipulate sufficient but not necessary ways to contract out of the 
default? Consider Ayres’s own example: Cardozo’s opinion in Jacob & 
Youngs v. Kent.31 Ayres helpfully observes that if Cardozo really wanted a 
rule that, as Cardozo wrote, would enable parties “by apt and certain words 
to effectuate a purpose that performance of every term shall be a condition 
of recovery,” Cardozo would have done well to “drop a footnote identifying 
what language would be sufficient” to achieve that purpose.32 That said, it is 
clear from the opinion that an express intention to condition payment on 
perfect tender is enough. Although Cardozo might have helped future 
parties by providing them with a legal formality, the rule he announced is at 
least as good as that in the Model Written Obligations Act. 
                                                
29 Id. at 2055 (footnote omitted). See also id. at 2081-82 (arguing that the 
best “password altering rules . . . are nonexclusive means—and are merely 
sufficient safe harbors—for achieving particular contractual concerns”). 
30 Supra note 19. 
31 Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889 (N.Y. 1921). 
32 129 NE. at 891; Ayres, Altering Rules, supra note 1 at 2056 (emphasis 
added). 
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What Ayres’s juristic theory cannot explain is why an express intent 
to opt-out of the substantial-performance condition is not necessary to 
avoid the default. Cardozo’s opinion provides the answer. When the parties 
have not expressed an intention one way or another, “[c]onsiderations 
partly of justice and partly of presumable intention are to tell us” whether 
their promises are independent, fully dependent, or dependent only on 
substantial performance.33 To reach that determination, “[w]e must weigh 
the purpose to be served, the desire to be gratified, the excuse for deviation 
from the letter, the cruelty of enforced adherence.”34 The first two parts of 
Cardozo’s famous test—the purpose of the term that has been breached and 
the desire that is meant to gratify—call for interpretation of the parties’ 
agreement. Only by an open-ended inquiry into the natural and reasonable 
understanding of the parties’ purposes in specifying Reading pipe and the 
foreseeable harm to the homeowner from breach of that term could the 
court determine whether the homeowner’s duty to pay was conditional on 
the builder’s perfect performance of the term. The rule here is an altering 
rule. Whether the duties are independent or dependent depends on what 
the parties said or did in reaching their agreement. But “what the parties 
said or did” refers not only to their performance vel non of the appropriate 
juristic act. It refers also to acts with the right nonlegal meanings, to the 
parties’ actual agreement. 
Another way of putting the point is that whereas Cardozo’s opinion 
focuses on the hermeneutic at the expense of the juristic, Ayres makes the 
opposite mistake. Ayres reads Jacob & Youngs v. Kent as establishing only a 
juristic altering rule, though in fact Cardozo’s primary concern is to explain 
a hermeneutic one. More generally, altering rules often “provide a non-
prolix, nonexclusive set of sufficiency rules” not to minimize transaction 
costs, but because contract law is about more than effecting the parties’ 
legal purposes, limited only by a bit of hard paternalism and the desire to 
prevent negative externalities. If we want a contract law sensitive to the 
parties’ nonlegal obligations, we also want altering rules that tell courts to 
look to the nonlegal meaning of what they say and do. To leave room for 
the operation of such hermeneutic altering rules, juristic rules must provide 
only non-necessary conditions for legal change. 
This last point suggests a related one: Ayres’s account of why we 
sometimes want sticky defaults and impeding altering rules is incomplete. 
Ayres adopts the economist’s view that there are only two possible 
justifications for restricting freedom to contract: “to protect people inside 
(paternalism) or outside (externalities) the contract.”35 Neither captures 
society’s possible interest in enforcing the moral obligation to perform, in 
                                                
33 129 N.E. at 890. 
34 129 N.E. at 891. 
35 Ayres, Altering Rules, supra note 1 at 2084. 
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doing justice between the parties after breach, or in supporting the moral 
culture of making and keeping agreements. Those and related duty-
imposing functions of contract law recommend rules whose primary 
purpose is not to assist the parties in achieving the legal change they want. 
There are two important consequences. First, hermeneutic altering rules 
often impose transaction costs not to protect parties or third parties, but as a 
side effect of their attempt to seek out the objectively reasonable, all-things-
considered understanding of the parties agreement. Such transaction costs 
are the acceptable if unintended consequences of rules whose primary 
function is not to promote party choice. Second, the duty-imposing function 
of contract law suggests a third reason for sometimes purposively increasing 
the costs of opting out, for adopting impeding altering rules. As I have 
written elsewhere: 
 
Stickier defaults, and by implication costlier opt-outs, . . . can 
mediate between the sometimes conflicting interests the law has in, 
on the one hand, granting parties the power to control the scope of 
their legal obligations and, on the other hand, imposing liability on 
parties because of extralegal wrongs they have committed, harms 
they have caused, or other considerations.36 
 
This mediating function is exemplified in the conditions of contractual 
validity. “By combining an enforcement default with a relatively costly opt- 
out rule, we can permit sophisticated and sufficiently motivated parties to 
avoid legal obligations they would otherwise owe one another without 
significantly impairing the duty-imposing functions of contract law.”37 In 
Ayres’s idiom, impeding altering rules can also be used to induce a 
separating equilibrium that both gives weight to contract law’s duty-
imposing functions and permits sophisticated parties to contract out of 
those duties.38 
Attention to the interplay between contract law and the parties’ 
nonlegal obligations suggests yet another amendment to Ayres’s theory, the 
last that I will propose in this comment. Early in the article, Ayres 
distinguishes altering standards, which do not provide clear ex ante 
displacement conditions, from altering rules, the paradigm being rules that 
employ formal legal acts.39 Ayres does not explain why we might 
sometimes prefer an altering standard to an altering rule. The above 
argument suggests one answer: the value of hermeneutic altering rules, 
                                                
36 Klass, Intent to Contract, supra note 2 at 1472. 
37 Id. at 1473. 
38 Ayres, Altering Rules, supra note 1 at 2088-92. 
39 Id. at 2037. 
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which resist formulation in lists of necessary and sufficient conditions. But 
there is another answer as well. 
Even if we care about the parties’ legal intent—even if we want a 
juristic altering rule—the relational costs of requiring an express statement 
of that intent might sometimes be too high.40 Because contracts are also 
agreements, they often ride atop relationships of trust, honor and even 
friendship. Economists have long recognized that these extralegal forms of 
trust can provide more efficient and effective incentives than does the law.41 
Where this is the case, a rule that requires parties to perform an otherwise 
cheap juristic act can end up imposing high relational costs on them. As 
Stuart Macaulay famously observed, “[b]usinessmen often prefer to rely on 
‘a man’s word’ in a brief letter, a handshake, or ‘common honesty and 
decency’—even when the transaction involves exposure to serious risks.”42 
Legal formalities and express opt-outs run contrary to that preference. 
Ayres does not systematically discuss the transaction costs that 
attach to different methods of avoiding a default. He touches on the costs of 
learning the rule, as well as specific costs that might come with error-
reducing or impeding altering rules. But in all this, he neglects the relational 
costs of rules that require the parties to expressly state their legal intent. 
Where those costs are high, we might prefer a rule that ask courts to engage 
in an all-things-considered interpretation of the parties’ legal intent, rather 
than one that asks the parties to state it at the time of contracting.43 Juristic 
altering standards are ceteris paribus preferable when requiring the parties 
to perform a juristic act is likely to do harm to valuable nonlegal forms of 
trust between them. 
None of the above thoughts call into question the Big Idea of 
Regulating Opt-Out: that contracts scholarship stands in need of a general 
theory of altering rules. It does. And Ayres has provided an important piece 
of that theory. Even more valuably, he has clearly identified a question that 
more contract scholars should be trying to answer. 
                                                
40 I discuss such relational costs in Klass, Intent to Contract, supra note 2 at 
1473-75. 
41 See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Order without Law: How Neighbors Settle 
Disputes (1991); Eric Posner, Law and Social Norms (2000). 
42 Stuart Macaulay, Non-contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary 
Study, 28 Am. Soc. Rev. 55, 58 (1963). 
43 See Klass, Intent to Contract, supra note 2 at 1465-69, 1496-97. 
